A $1 Million Warning for AP: Validate Bank Accounts Before Money Moves – Part II

Make Every Bank Account Change a High-Risk Event
(This is Part II of a two-part article; see Part I here.)
Fraudsters lean on urgency — the old account is closed, the payment’s overdue, an executive is waiting, a shipment gets held up if AP doesn’t move now.
AP leaders should draw a hard line: urgency never overrides verification. Every request to add or change bank account details is high-risk, full stop — regardless of the supplier’s history, the dollar amount, the deadline, or who’s asking.
A strong bank account change policy needs to cover the following.
1. Route requests through a secure portal. Bank information shouldn’t travel over ordinary email when a secure alternative exists. A self-service supplier portal keeps sensitive submissions from being intercepted, altered, or scattered across inboxes, and it should require strong authentication and log who submitted what, and when.
2. Independently validate ownership. Every new account and every account change go through automated ownership validation — checked against the actual supplier, not just confirmed to exist. A real account belonging to the wrong person is still a fraud loss.
3. Separate data changes from payment approval. The person entering new bank account information shouldn’t also be the one approving the change and releasing payment. That separation limits the damage from a mistake, an insider, or stolen credentials. High-dollar or unusual changes should get an extra layer of approval.
4. Investigate mismatches instead of working around them. A failed or inconclusive validation is a signal, not a nuisance to clear. Put the account on hold, document what didn’t match, and investigate using contact information sourced independently — never the phone number or email address that came with the change request.
5. Delay payments after sensitive changes. Where it’s practical, build in a cooling-off period between approving new bank details and releasing the first payment against them. That gap gives fraud alerts and unauthorized-change detection time to catch up. Dollar thresholds, a second review, or a small test payment can help on higher-risk changes.
6. Maintain a complete audit trail. Be able to show what was submitted, how it was validated, what came back, who reviewed any exceptions, who approved the change, and when the account became payable. That’s what audits and investigations run on, and it keeps everyone accountable.
Bank Account Validation Should Be Part of a Layered Defense
Automated bank account validation matters, but it isn’t the whole system. A solid vendor onboarding and vendor master data process also needs Tax ID matching, OFAC and sanctions screening, duplicate detection, approval workflows, supplier authentication, and ongoing monitoring and revalidation of the vendor master.
AP shouldn’t own this alone, either — treasury, procurement, information security, internal audit and banking partners all have a stake. Payment fraud isn’t only an AP problem, even though AP is usually the last checkpoint before funds leave.
Training still matters. AP staff should understand how business email compromise works, recognize social engineering, and feel able to stop a payment that looks wrong. But that can’t be the whole strategy. Even well-trained people get fooled, especially when a message contains real information and lands during a busy week. Technology is the backstop that doesn’t get tired, rushed, or talked into anything.
Ask Hard Questions Before the Next Request Arrives
Don’t wait for a suspicious bank account change to find out where the process breaks. Ask now:
- Do we independently validate every new supplier bank account?
- Do we revalidate every requested account change?
- Can we confirm an account actually belongs to the intended supplier?
- Are suppliers submitting sensitive information through secure channels?
- Are employees relying on contact details that came with the request itself?
- Can urgent payments bypass established controls?
- Who has the ability to change vendor master data?
- Can the same employee change the account and approve the payment?
- What happens when validation fails or comes back inconclusive?
- Can we produce a complete audit trail for every bank account change?
- Do domestic and international accounts get the same level of scrutiny?
Any answer you’re not sure of is a place to tighten up.
Stop Fraud Before Recovery Becomes the Strategy
Recovering the funds in the Guam case is a good outcome, but recovery can’t be the plan. Once money reaches a criminal-controlled account, it moves again — split up, converted, pushed across jurisdictions — and the organization is left contacting its bank, bringing in law enforcement, preserving evidence, notifying insurers, and managing the fallout, reputational and otherwise.
Automated bank account validation moves the effort upstream, from recovering money after the fact to stopping the misdirection before it happens.
VendorInfo helps organizations securely collect supplier information, automate bank account ownership validation, and build that verification directly into onboarding and change-management workflows — confirming independently that an account is open and belongs to the intended payee, instead of trusting an email chain, a phone call, or a document that might have been altered.
Fraudsters only need one bank account change to get through. AP needs to catch every one.
To learn how VendorInfo can automate your vendor bank account verification, contact us.


